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 
Abstract— Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a state-of-the-
art method of generating cryptographic keys by exchanging 
single photons. Measurements on the photons are constrained by 
the laws of quantum mechanics, and it is from this that the keys 
derive their security. Current public key encryption relies on 
mathematical problems that cannot be solved efficiently using 
present-day technologies; however, it is vulnerable to 
computational advances. In contrast QKD generates truly 
random keys secured against computational advances and more 
general attacks when implemented properly. On the other hand, 
networks are moving towards a process of softwarization with 
the main objective to reduce cost in both, the deployment and in 
the network maintenance. This process replaces traditional 
network functionalities (or even full network instances) typically 
performed in network devices to be located as software 
distributed across commodity data centers. Within this context, 
network function virtualization (NFV) is a new concept in which 
operations of current proprietary hardware appliances are 
decoupled and run as software instances. However, the security 
of NFV still needs to be addressed prior to deployment in the real 
world. In particular, virtual network function (VNF) distribution 
across data centers is a risk for network operators, as an 
eavesdropper could compromise not just virtualized services, but 
the whole infrastructure. 
We demonstrate, for the first time, a secure architectural 
solution for VNF distribution, combining NFV orchestration and 
QKD technology by scheduling an optical network using SDN. A 
time-shared approach is designed and presented as a cost-
effective solution for practical deployment, showing the 
performance of different quantum links in a distributed 
environment. 
Index Terms—Network Functions Virtualization, Quantum 
Key Distribution, Software Defined Networking. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ETWORK function virtualization (NFV) promises 
significant network infrastructure simplification as 
current hardware appliances are replaced with software 
running on standard servers. NFV is complemented by 
software-defined networking (SDN), provisioning the required 
network connectivity to respond to newly instantiated 
appliances by aligning heterogeneous network topologies in an 
automated manner. In addition, NFV provides an on-demand 
instantiation of the required network functions without 
installation of any new equipment and distributes the functions 
via the fastest network service provisioning possible. 
However, as in other network softwarization processes, there 
are security risks associated in the deployment of an NFV 
solution. In an NFV-enabled network infrastructure, network 
functions are stored centrally as software images in a remote 
data center (DC) where they can be cloned, transferred and 
deployed as virtual functions on commodity servers (replacing 
network appliances) across the network. This transfer of 
network functions must be secured, as any attempt to tamper 
with NFV can create a significant security breach. For 
instance, if a transmitted software image of a network function 
contains any sensitive information, such as a firewall, its 
interception and/or alteration can compromise an entire 
network. 
A leading candidate for protecting against this type of 
security threat is quantum key distribution (QKD), a 
contemporary approach to the generation of symmetric keys 
[1]. In QKD, keys are distributed by transmitting single 
photons from a sender (QKD-Alice) to a receiver (QKD-Bob) 
over a quantum channel. This channel can be implemented 
using fibre optics or in free space. Fundamental laws of 
physics prevent an eavesdropper (Eve) from learning the key, 
as any attempt made to gain information about the photons 
will irreversibly change them in a manner that can be readily 
detected. An additional benefit of QKD is that the keys it 
generates can be considered future-proof from hacking. As 
they are truly random, no information can be gained from a 
mathematical attack, regardless of any computational 
advances. 
Building on these principles, we propose and experimentally 
demonstrate the inclusion of QKD to tackle NFV’s security 
problems. Utilizing SDN technology, a cost-efficient method 
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for time-sharing the QKD systems is presented, demonstrating 
the ease of which these systems can be integrated with an 
NFV platform. This paper extends the description presented in 
[2] with a more thorough description of the experimental work 
and the scheduling process. Moreover, this paper enhances [2] 
by adding trusted node functionality for longer distances. 
The paper is organized as follows: section II provides a short 
introduction to the NFV MANO framework, shows our 
architectural approach and introduces the integration with 
QKD; section III focuses on how SDN can reduced costs in a 
QKD network by time-sharing the available resources, as well 
as demonstrating a trusted node architecture; section IV 
describes the experimental test-bed; section V presents our 
experimental results and section VI concludes the paper.  
 
Fig 1 NFV MANO architecture for distributed DCs 
II. NFV MANO ARCHITECTURE 
The NFV management and orchestration (MANO) 
specification document has been developed within the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [3]. 
The architecture is organized into three layers: the 
orchestrator, virtual network function (VNF) managers, and 
the virtual infrastructure manager (VIM). Existing solutions 
approach the functional distribution in several different ways 
and/or are not complete (they provide implementations of 
different functional modules), due to a lack of standardization. 
In this paper, we define and implement a prototype of the 
ETSI NFV architecture for distributed DCs (Fig. 1) within an 
emulated metro area network (MAN). Our approach splits the 
architecture into a centralized orchestrator (NFV CO) acting 
as a master node and different ETSI NFV stacks operating in 
slave mode for each data center.  The NFV CO is composed of 
a Python backend core, mySQL database maintaining 
information regarding users, virtual infrastructures and 
distributed nodes, a graphical user interface (GUI) and 
representational state transfer (RESTful) interfaces to facilitate 
platform users and administrators to manage their 
infrastructures. Network function images are stored within the 
centralized orchestrator DC, which is responsible for their 
distribution based on service demands. When a 
service/infrastructure request arrives at the orchestrator, the 
service chain is split into network requirements (that will be 
pushed into an SDN controller) along with network nodes and 
endpoints (distributed among the DCs).  
The slave-mode stack implements the MANO architecture 
composed of three layers, as previously mentioned:  
• The orchestrator (NFV MANO gateway) acts as a 
gateway between the NFV CO and the DC, taking 
care of importing and, when required, decrypting the 
VNF images, orchestrating the different endpoints 
within a data center. 
• The VNF managers provide lifecycle management and 
monitor VNFs to control startup, scaling and 
termination of the functions (not implemented on the 
first prototype). 
• The VIM manages the resources to create VNF 
instances (VNFI), orchestrating the virtual machines 
(VMs) and Linux containers (based on OpenStack 
and Docker, respectively). 
The current implementation interfaces the different modules 
of the architecture using RESTful APIs to send instructions. 
For file transmission it uses the secure file transfer protocol 
(SFTP) or the transmission control protocol (TCP), both of 
which are tested. Regarding the network configuration, the CO 
to SDN controller communicates through an SSH-based 
interface, following the policy based approach shown in [4]. 
 
Fig 2 Point to point link integration of our distributed NFV MANO 
architecture and the QKD system 
A. Integration with QKD 
In the proposed NFV architecture, the NFV CO holds a 
catalogue of the network functions hosted in its trusted DC. To 
make use of these virtualized network functions, the images 
containing them must be cloned and securely transmitted to 
remote data centers. Conventionally, secure channels are 
established using public key cryptography, which relies on the 
presumed computational difficulty of solving certain 
mathematical problems. Although the public keys do not 
always encrypt the data directly, they can be used for 
symmetric key transport (e.g. key exchange using Diffie-
Hellman). To evolve our NFV MANO architecture, we have 
integrated commercial ID Quantique QKD systems (ID3100 
Clavis2) [5] as shown in Fig. 2. The network that connects the 
QKD pair comprises a 25ms-switching, large-port count, 
programmable beam-steering optical switch (PolatisTM), 
logically partitioned into two smaller interconnected switches 
to enable multiple link emulation. The optical network and the 
switch are used for directing both standard and quantum 
signals between the nodes. 
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When an image needs to be transmitted, the NFV CO asks 
for a key from the QKD-Bob using the proprietary IDQ3P 
protocol (based on the Q3P specification [6]), before the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric key 
algorithm is used, together with key, to encrypt the image, 
informing the remote platform of the transmission and the key 
ID needed for image decryption. While we use the standard 
AES algorithm in this experiment, the one-time pad (OTP) 
algorithm could easily be used instead for mission critical 
transmissions (e.g. small size configuration files or 
management commands.). The workflow is shown in fig. 3. 
 
Fig 3 Workflow for the end-to-end distribution of VNFs 
III. TIME-SHARED QKD NETWORK BASED ON SDN 
QKD networks have previously been demonstrated in field 
experiments [7-8]. However, the technology deployed is yet to 
reach a stage where it can be mass produced at low cost. 
Losses and channel noise also present deployment limitations 
for QKD. Current approaches for quantum networks focus on 
the deployment of point-to-point links, where a pair of QKD 
devices is required for each connection. In order to reduce the 
financial expenditure of deploying a QKD network, we 
propose a time-scheduled solution. Based on the specific 
requirements of our architecture we can reduce the number of 
physical devices required by time-sharing QKD resources. 
 
Fig 4 Logical representation of the timeshared QKD network 
 Fig. 2 shows our novel QKD-enabled NFV architecture in 
an SDN controlled optical network, while Fig. 4 shows the 
one-to-many QKD network approach. Our implementation of 
the network scheduler enables a single physical QKD-Bob to 
be time-shared between multiple endpoints (QKD-Alice) 
allowing the establishment of multiple secure connections 
using fewer QKD devices than would normally be required. 
This method reduces the cost of the proposed secure NFV 
architecture because of the significant reduction in hardware 
and, for improved systems that utilize plug-and-play QKD 
devices, allows the most sophisticated components to be 
contained within a single time-shared unit. 
 
Fig 5 Scheduler's workflow for timesharing the QKD network. 
In addition, the optical connections can be reconfigured 
quickly using SDN, also integrated with the scheduler. The 
scheduler synchronizes with the QKD units allocated in the 
NFV stacks and the NFV CO domains. This scheduling is 
undertaken assuming that the QKD channel and the classical 
data channels are multiplexed in space (i.e. carried over 
different fibers). The scheduling process can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) The scheduler identifies the QKD-Alice nodes that need to 
share a particular QKD-Bob node (information provided by 
the NFV CO). 
2) The scheduling mechanism utilizes information extracted 
from the network SDN controller to create the required end-
to-end connectivity for the QKD-Alice/Bob pairs. It 
establishes optical connections between the QKD-Bob and 
every QKD-Alice, sequentially one connection at a time. 
3) The key servers are started and put on hold until the QKD 
initialization process has finished. 
4) the scheduler extracts the generated keys from both QKD 
units, storing them alongside the key IDs extracted from the 
response message. 
The scheduler follows the flow chart shown in Fig. 5. It 
analyses which connections are most critical based on the 
average of requested bits per second and current number of 
keys available, and tries to keep a balance between the 
connections. The scheduler keeps important information of 
each link: average of requests per second, number of available 
keys, initialization times and the key generation speed. It is 
important to notice that the scheduler is subject to a number of 
constraints when planning the switching: 
1) At the start, it has to consider which connection is most 
critical, i.e. which end-to-end connection will require key 
extraction soonest (the lower time “t” where “t” is equal to 
the current number of keys in bits divided by the average 
number of requests for a given connection in bits/second). 
2) Once the connection has been stablished and the key 
extraction process initiated, the scheduler checks whether the 
number of keys already extracted are enough to cope with the 
number of requests for a given time (as an example, we 
consider twice the initialization time of each of the remaining 
connections). 
3) While one connection is active, the scheduler monitors if 
the others are in a critical situation by: a) sorting the 
connections from lowest to highest priority, b) for the nth 
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connection in the list, check if it can remain live for time T, 
where: 
 
where  is the initialization time for a given connection “i”. 
If step 3) finds connections in a critical situation and condition 
2) is satisfied, the scheduler will change the current 
configuration. If during these steps some conditions are not 
satisfied (not enough keys to cope with all the requests in the 
links), the scheduler should raise an alarm to a network 
management system either to increase the number of devices 
or to dynamically activate existing ones to cope with the 
demand for keys. To avoid generating an excess of keys for a 
single connection while others are consuming, we have set up 
an adaptive threshold to stop the current active connection. 
This threshold is calculated with the remaining live time of the 
other connections. Some of the values (e.g. time considered 
for a connection to be alive) have been hardcoded for this test. 
In order to calculate more accurate values, the scheduler 
should perform data analytics over previously monitored data. 
The scheduling process works offline, so that at any time the 
NFV CO requires keys to encrypt an image, there will be keys 
available for any combination of endpoints. 
 
Fig 6 Example of workflow for multi-hop key distribution (single 
trusted node) 
A. Key distribution in a multi-hop QKD network. 
While it may provide much stronger security, QKD still has 
its limitations. Current state-of-the-art demonstrations can 
reach up to 307 kilometers [9], although the secret key rate 
drops significantly. If the separation between nodes is large, a 
multi-hop approach (conventionally referred to as trusted 
nodes) will be required, utilizing one or more intermediate 
trusted nodes. These nodes have to manage keys associated 
with different end points, while maintaining the secrecy of the 
keys and retaining an awareness about certain pieces of 
topological information (neighboring nodes, that may also be 
used for routing requests). 
We have logically extended the topology presented in Fig. 4 
adding a fourth node (NFV stack). In order to populate a key 
from the new domain to the NFV CO, the intermediate node 
(Alice 1) has to coordinate both endpoints, extract two 
different keys (one per connection), and finally use one to 
encrypt the other before transmitting it to the appropriate Bob. 
More explicitly, the workflow is as shown in Fig. 6: 
1) The NFV CO (Bob) extracts a key and key ID from the 
QKD boxes (in our case, from the scheduler) 
2) The NFV CO sends a message to the trusted node, 
including the key ID and the destination ID to be reached (in 
this example, an IP). 
3)  The trusted node (Alice 1) extracts the key for the first 
connection using the first key ID. 
4) The trusted node extracts a key and key ID for the second 
connection from the scheduler. 
5) The trusted node sends a message including the key ID of 
the second connection, as well as the ID of the source node. 
6) The destination node (new NFV slave, Bob 2) extracts the 
key, pairing it with the source ID, and it returns an ACK when 
successfully finished. 
7) The trusted node performs an XOR operation with key1 
and key2 to encrypt key2 and sends the result to the NFV CO. 
8) The NFV CO performs an XOR with the encrypted key and 
key1, obtaining key2. 
Note that this is just one example of how to propagate keys in 
a trusted node QKD network (the trusted node could have sent 
key1 to the destination node or both endpoints could have the 
other endpoint key). By carrying out this set of operations, the 
NFV CO and the new deployed NFV slave can successfully 
start encrypting their communications. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL TEST-BED 
Our time-shared QKD test-bed logically comprises four 
nodes, as shown in Fig. 4. Node 1 contains a QKD-Bob device 
and a key server. These are time shared with three emulated 
QKD-Alice devices (Nodes 2 to 4) and their key servers. In 
each node, keys can be extracted for use in a number of 
different protocols, such as AES or OTP. The QKD-Alice/Bob 
nodes are connected via a dynamic, and reconfigurable circuit-
switched optical network. The QKD-Alices are emulated in a 
way such that the same physical device is used, but the 
network path changes for each emulated node. Note, for the 
purposes of this demonstration, an initial step changing the 
authentication keys between QKD devices was omitted and 
will be implemented in future work. Our optical network is 
composed by the abovementioned SDN-enabled Polatis 
switch, emulating the different logical nodes. The switch is 
loopback connected using several fibre lengths to emulate the 
different links. The QKD-Alice/Bob units, operating at 1551.7 
nm, are controlled by separate servers using a software suite 
designed for automated hardware operation and key 
distillation. In this experiment, the QKD and classical data 
channels are always confined to separate fibers. This test-bed 
is equipped with two Dell T630 servers running the proposed 
NFV architecture stack, the SDN controller for the optical 
network (OpenDaylight) and the QKD device scheduling 
mechanism. 
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Fig 7 Average of initialization time for each link 
 
Fig 8 Measured key rates for the different links 
 
Fig 9 Measure QBER and attenuation for the different links 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The results from our time-shared QKD network are shown 
in Fig. 7-9. Fig. 7 shows the measured average initialization 
time for each QKD-Alice/Bob pairs, i.e. the time taken for 
synchronization, characterization of the setup and generation 
of the first set of keys. The measured average initialization 
time increases with the distance between QKD-Alice/Bob. 
Compared to the back-to-back (BtB) case, where the average 
initialization time is 400s, a threefold increase to 1265s at 25 
km is observed, indicating that as the distance (and power 
penalty) increases, the time taken to initialize becomes 
substantially larger. This result is particularly useful when 
time-sharing the QKD-Bob, as it allows a sensible estimate of 
the delays encountered when cyclically communicating 
between different QKD-Alice units. Fig. 8 shows the secret 
key rate as a function of distance. The mean values are 
represented by the circular marker, while the maximum and 
minimum values are shown as error bars. The secret key rate 
in the BtB scenario is ~4 kb/s, while in the 25km case the rate 
drops to ~0.1 kb/s, due to the additional attenuation. These 
values slightly differ from the ones exposed in the Clavis2 
specification file (higher rates than 0.5 kbps over 25 km). This 
is due to additional attenuation introduced in the link by the 
two cross connections (between 1 and 2 dB loss per cross 
connection) plus small losses in each connector (around 0.5 
dB). In optimal conditions, a 25 km SMF has losses between 5 
and 6 dB. In our case, we measured a total loss above 10dB, 
which reduces the measured rate. These factors clearly reduce 
the optimal performance of the optical link. Fig. 9 shows the 
quantum bit error rate (QBER). In line with the other results 
shown, the longer the distance between QKD–Alice/Bob 
nodes the higher the QBER, affecting the secret key rate with 
linear proportionality. A QBER of 5.3% is reached for a QKD 
pair of over 25km of standard single-mode fibre (SSMF). The 
linear fit in Fig. 9 (green) is calculated using the measured 
data with a –log10(QBER) to show the exponential relation 
between QBER and distance (and, similarly, attenuation). 
For the multi-hop setup, we emulated two links using the 
same pair of devices, having the same distance for the two 
hops (5 km each). In this case, the workflow was programmed 
in Python, running the three nodes in three different servers 
spread across the lab. The interfaces used for this use case 
were IDQ3P for key extraction and HTTP for communication 
among the nodes. The HTTP response from the intermediate 
node (ACK(enc) in Fig. 6) contains the encrypted key (key1 ⊕ 
key2) as raw data, which is used by the NFV CO to extract 
key2 using key1. An example of this execution for a 32 byte 
key exchange is: 
Key1:0x063c394625fb316d899e849265ca04b25fbd3eaf12cf51
a48871f9c7a548ae40 
Enc:0x07098e88af3dcc5f0c558d0b751028553031c6e6131461
96ae7b11cb4cb43bc9 
Key2:0x0135b7ce8ac6fd3285cb099910da2ce76f8cf84901db3
032260ae80ce9fc9589 
 Fig. 10 shows the encrypted key (data) transmitted in the 
HTTP response. 
 
Fig 10 Encrypted key transmitted from the trusted node to the NFV 
CO node 
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Regarding image transmission between the nodes, our setup 
was composed of three Dell PowerEdge T630 servers (one 
hosting the orchestrator, one hosting the ETSI NFV stack in 
slave mode and one hosting the SDN controller and 
scheduling mechanism), with 10Gb/s small form-factor 
pluggable interfaces allowing the servers to communicate 
through our optical network at 1310nm. In here, any 
wavelength can be used since the data and quantum channels 
are carried over separate fibres (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig 11 Different times for image encryption, transmission and 
decryption 
As shown in Fig. 11, in our implementation the 
transmission of the 16GB Windows Server image including 
encryption (126s), transmission through a standard socket 
(33s) and decryption (144s) took ~305s. At the same time, 
using secure file transfer protocol (SFTP) for the transmission 
takes ~405s. Note, these timings are intended to be illustrative 
as they vary depending on the computational load of the server 
and the specific implementation details of sockets and SFTP. 
 
Fig 12 Wireshark capture showing the chain of messages 
Fig. 12 shows the capture of messages exchanged for the 
VNF transmission to the remote DC, as shown previously in 
Fig. 3. The first message initiates the workflow, before the 
orchestrator creates the required network connectivity for the 
transmission by sending CFlow_mod OpenFlow messages to 
the Polatis switch through OpenDaylight (highlighted in red). 
The orchestrator requires the key from the QKD-Bob unit to 
encrypt the image and sends it to the remote DC by using a 
standard TCP socket (highlighted in green). We also 
performed this transmission using SFTP. To finalize the 
process, the orchestrator informs the image and key IDs to be 
used for the decryption, sending an acknowledgement ACK 
(HTTP 200) when the process is finished. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the integration of an NFV orchestration 
platform over SDN-controlled optical networks with quantum-
key-distribution systems is shown for the first time. A 
particular ETSI-NFV inter-DC architecture has been designed 
on a QKD compatible optical network test-bed to provide 
enhanced security capabilities for VNF distribution across 
DCs. A novel SDN-based resource scheduling method for 
time-sharing a single QKD-Bob between multiple QKD-Alice 
units. Furthermore, we show that our solution could be applied 
in longer distances by applying a multi-hop approach to 
distribute keys on the network. Results demonstrate that an 
SSMF link of up to 25 km can be secured using quantum 
encryption for NFV MANO operations with a simultaneous 
SDN control, showing a minimum QBER of 5.3%. 
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